W
hen it comes to enforcing laws and protecting communities, society grants police offi cers special powers to apply force, including deadly force. Still, police offi cers are taught that deadly force is a last resort to protect someone from imminent death or serious injury. To ensure that his department was minimizing unnecessary fi rearm discharges, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly asked the RAND Corporation to study the issue.
In 2007, RAND researchers talked with New York City Police Department (NYPD) plainclothes and uniformed offi cers, collected and reviewed policy documents, and examined relevant general literature on policing, use of force, and refl exive and contagious shooting. Th e team also analyzed fi rearm-discharge cases; NYPD personnel data; stop, question, and frisk report data; and data from the automated, online booking system. Finally, the team collected information from other police departments and sponsored a daylong discussion of the issues with a panel of independent national experts. Th is research brief summarizes key fi ndings and recommendations.
Training
Training consists of basic recruit training and in-service training. Overall, the team found that basic policing-skills training adhered to modern principles and standards of eff ective adult learning but that training in complex policing skillsthose that integrate law and policy, eff ective communication, decisionmaking, and tactics-could be improved. Th e nine weeks of recruit training devoted to hands-on, complex policing skills is largely done in scenario-based, role-playing workshops or with simulators, which have become the nationally accepted norm for teaching these subjects. However, the logistics of these workshops
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and the size of the recruit-training class mean that some students might not have fully mastered all lessons before having to move on to the next class. Alternative arrangements could allow each student to progress at his or her own pace. Th e new NYPD Training Academy facility will also provide a more appropriate training environment to carry out this kind of training.
NYPD offi cers must also requalify on their fi rearms twice a year. Th is is now done by shooting at static targets, but new courses being developed at NYPD, which require offi cers to shoot at moving targets, from crouched positions, and after exertion, are more likely to refl ect realworld situations. While moving 37,000 offi cers through the fi rearm requalifi cation course every six months is logistically challenging, remedial training should be provided to offi cers who demonstrate poor fi rearm techniques, even if they achieved a passing score.
Based on these fi ndings, the authors recommend increasing the recruits' exposure to scenario-based training and evaluating and not passing them until they demonstrate skill mastery at an appropriate level. Th ey also recom-
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mend investigating alternatives to the current semiannual fi rearm-requalifi cation paradigm to provide enhanced fi rearm instruction that would focus on the offi cer's profi ciency, not just the score on static targets.
Firearms Discharge Review Board Investigation and Reporting
Based on the review of national best practices, NYPD has a number of exemplary features, including substantial and appropriate command attention at the incident scene (the nature of which varies with incident seriousness) and a process that generally results in reasoned disciplinary action where appropriate.
To improve the current process, the authors recommend (1) expanding the focus to include a formal review of the tactics involved, including whether offi cers unnecessarily gave themselves no choice but to fi re their weapons; (2) formally developing lessons learned that could be disseminated to all offi cers; (3) better responding to key investigative questions, such as whether less-than-lethal force options were available; and (4) providing more synthesis in fi nal reports-i.e., more analysis and less fact.
Factors Associated with NYPD Offi cers Discharging Firearms
While the average NYPD offi cer is very unlikely to be involved in a shooting (0.26 percent annually), the authors found-matching actual shooting offi cers with those nonshooting offi cers near the scene of shooting incidents-that they could statistically determine that certain offi cer characteristics are associated with a higher risk of being involved in a shooting. Shooting offi cers tended to be younger, get more medals, accumulate more negative marks in their fi les (referred to as Central Personnel Index [CPI] points), make more felony arrests, be injured in the line of duty, have more complaints fi led against them, and have special, nonpatrol-offi cer assignments. Th ese characteristics describe a more assertive offi cer, one who can do heroic actions and garner medals and simultaneously perform actions that warrant negative marks. Since the vast majority of offi cers who shared these same characteristics never discharged their weapons, it was not possible to use this analysis as a screening tool before the fact. Given this fi nding, the authors recommend that the NYPD pay particular attention when investigating shootings involving offi cers with an annual CPI-point average in excess of 3.1 to make sure that those offi cers did everything appropriate before discharging their fi rearms. While the NYPD already monitors those offi cers exceeding a career total of 20 CPI points, closer monitoring of offi cers with a high accumulation rate of CPI points may also be warranted.
Need for Improved Less-Than-Lethal Standoff Weapons and Other Innovative Technologies
Analysis of the NYPD fi rearm-discharge cases and the experience of other police departments suggest that, if the NYPD had a broader deployment of a more robust less-than-lethal standoff weapon, such as TASER® devices, it not only might prevent some incidents from escalating to deadly force but might also reduce injuries to offi cers and citizens alike, as has been the case in other departments. While the NYPD does provide pepper spray to all patrol offi cers and TASER devices to patrol supervisors on a limited basis, the authors recommend that the NYPD implement a pilot program that expands the current availability of TASER devices to all patrol offi cers in selected precincts.
Also, given the potential of laser sights and handgunmounted fl ashlights, the authors recommend a test of laser sights with plainclothes offi cers followed by a pilot study with uniformed offi cers and a pilot test of handgun-mounted fl ashlights.
Refl exive Shooting
Data on intentional refl exive discharges (or contagious shootings) are not readily available, neither within NYPD nor across departments, which means that the team could not determine the extent of refl exive shootings or whether they are increasing or decreasing over time. Still, given that they occur, the team recommends that the NYPD modify training to include refl exive-shooting scenarios in which a stimulus or the sounds of guns going off are included, to sensitize offi cers to cues that may not be reliable and to teach them that such cues may generate unwanted responses; have offi cers practice with the correct decisionmaking process to reduce the use of inappropriate decisionmaking shortcuts; and ensure that all offi cers in a shooting undergo the mandatory one-day range refresher course. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. 
